Does the evidence that our universe contains fine-tuned life confirm the multiverse hypothesis? The answer depends on our approach to self-locating beliefs. In a recent paper, Isaacs, Hawthorne, and Russell (2022) offer two arguments for thinking that such evidence does confirm the multiverse hypothesis. First, they argue that the three leading approaches to self-locating beliefs all entail that such evidence confirms the multiverse hypothesis. Second, they present a pair of theorems showing that any approach to self-locating beliefs that satisfies certain (...) “reasonable” constraints will entail that such evidence confirms the multiverse hypothesis. I argue that Isaacs, Hawthorne, and Russell’s two arguments are not compelling, the first because they fail to consider some natural approaches to self-locating beliefs, the second because their theorems rely on a suspect premise that we should reject. Contra Issacs, Hawthorne, and Russell, I argue that on a natural approach to self-locating beliefs the evidence that our universe contains fine-tuned life needn’t confirm the multiverse hypothesis. (shrink)

Many draw the distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world. The latter notion purportedly allows for propositions to be true relative to worlds even if they do not exist relative to those same worlds. Despite its wide application, the distinction is controversial. Some think that the notion of truth at a world is unintelligible. Here, I outline and discuss the most influential argument for the unintelligibility of truth at a world, The Picture Thinking Argument. I outline and (...) defend a neglected strategy to respond to this, arguing that if we take seriously the idea that possible worlds represent total ways the world could be, the distinction can be drawn intelligibly. (shrink)

Canada’s rapid rise in deaths from euthanasia and physician assisted suicide, termed Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in the country, now ranks it second only to the Netherlands in terms of MAiD deaths as percentage of overall deaths, with one province already hosting the highest rate of all jurisdictions in the world. Analyzing Health Canada’s annual MAID reports, which show that up to 336 out of 1837 providers are likely responsible for the majority of MAID deaths in a given year, (...) we discuss how the rapid increase likely reflects not a broad Canadian consensus but the capture of a policy-making and implementation process by a small group of activists and clinicians colonizing medicine to become an ideologically driven vehicle for expanding MAID access and delivery. As a remedy and to reprioritize patient safety and protection against premature death, a more transparent, relevant, and safeguarded compliance regime based on evidence-based, multi-perspective policy-making is needed. (shrink)

Is speaker knowledge necessary or sufficient for enabling hearers to know from testimony? Here, we offer a novel argument for the answer no, based on the systematic effects of partial belief and the hearer’s view prior to hearing testimony. Modelling partial belief by credence, we show that a requirement entailed by the principles of necessity and sufficiency apparent in the literature is inconsistent with Bayesian updating. Consequently, even when the other grounds of knowledge are in place, the audience correctly updating (...) their partial belief can block the transmission of speaker knowledge, so it need not be sufficient. Nor need speaker knowledge be necessary, because the hearer correctly updating their partial belief can put them in the position to know even though no one in the speaker’s chain knows. We articulate the correct principles of testimonial knowledge transmission. The first supports a shared-credit view of transmission. The second gives a novel and systematic argument for testimony sometimes being a generative (not transmissive) source of knowledge, an argument that makes Lackey’s statement account of testimony otiose. Finally, on at least one account of causation, the two amended principles together show how speaker knowledge can be a cause whose effect is hearer’s knowledge. (shrink)

Plongé au cœur des nanos, Christophe Vieu souligne la diversité des secteurs touchés par l’approche nano. À l’idée d’une convergence des secteurs scientifiques, il oppose l’image d’une espèce invasive. Il se sent de ce fait investi d’une responsabilité de l’ensemble des technosciences.

Designing effective computational systems is often a matter of finding ways in which simple logical operations can be combined to perform more complex tasks. Computer scientists therefore gauge the complexity of tasks by asking how many such operations would be needed to perform them. They are especially concerned with cases in which the number of these operations is so large that the task cannot feasibly be performed by computational means. This happens whenever a task that takes n bits of information (...) to specify requires X^n operations to perform. Unless n is very small, the magnitude of the computational resources that would be needed to perform such tasks exceeds anything that could plausibly be available within a brain, or that could have been available over the course of intelligence’s evolution. When intelligent creatures succeed in dealing with tasks of this sort, their success therefore cannot be explained simply by the postulation of a computation. We must instead adopt an explanatory strategy that takes into account not only the things that are intelligently done but also the bounds within which this intelligence is accomplished. The question of which tasks exhibit such complexity is among the most fundamental open questions in theoretical computer science. (shrink)

Aristotle has qualms about the movement of the soul. He contends directly, indeed, that ‘it is impossible that motion should belong to the soul’ (DA 406a2). This is surprising in both large and small ways. Still, when we appreciate the explanatory framework set by his hylomorphic analysis of change, we can see why Aristotle should think of the soul's motion as involving a kind of category mistake-not the putative Rylean mistake, but rather the mistake of treating a change as itself (...) capable of changing. (shrink)

Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.

At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to (...) show that much of cognition consists in thinking by means of mental imagery, without the help of concepts, and that language is a tool by which interlocutors coordinate their actions in pursuit of shared goals. Imagistic cognition supports the acquisition and use of this tool, and when the use of this tool is internalized, it becomes the very medium of conceptual thought. (shrink)

The distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world plays a significant role in many debates in modal metaphysics. In this note, I argue that there are two radically different ways of making the distinction precise. I argue that the differences matter, showing how they differently constrain the modal metaphysics of properties and propositions.

In ‘Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’, we develop a novel account of how it is that AI can be trustworthy and what it takes for an AI to be trustworthy. In this paper, we respond to a suite of recent comments on this account, due to J. Adam Carter, Dong-yong Choi, Rune Nyrup, and Fei Song. We would like to thank all four for their thoughtful engagement with our work, as well as the Asian Journal of Philosophy for publishing the symposium on (...) our paper. The game plan for the paper is as follows. We will first briefly rehearse the account and then respond to comments in turn. (shrink)

In this interview, Christopher Norris discusses a wide range of issues having to do with postmodernism, deconstruction and other controversial topics of debate within present-day philosophy and critical theory. More specifically he challenges the view of deconstruction as just another offshoot of the broader postmodernist trend in cultural studies and the social sciences. Norris puts the case for deconstruction as continuing the 'unfinished project of modernity' and—in particular—for Derrida's work as sustaining the values of enlightened critical reason in various (...) spheres of thought from epistemology to ethics, sociology and politics. Along the way he addresses a number of questions that have lately been raised with particular urgency for teachers and educationalists, among them the revival of creationist doctrine and the idea of scientific knowledge as a social, cultural, or discursive construct. In this context he addresses the 'science wars' or the debate between those who uphold t. (shrink)

With the goal of understanding how Christopher Southgate communicates his in-depth knowledge of both science and theology, we investigated the many roles he assumes as a teacher. We settled upon wide-ranging topics that all intertwine: (1) his roles as author and coordinating editor of a premier textbook on science and theology, now in its third edition; (2) his oral presentations worldwide, including plenaries, workshops, and short courses; and (3) the team teaching approach itself, which is often needed by others (...) because the knowledge of science and theology do not always reside in the same person. Southgate provides, whenever possible, teaching contexts that involve students in experiential learning, where they actively participate with other students.We conclude that Southgate’s ultimate goal is to teach students how to reconcile science and theology in their values and beliefs, so that they can take advantage of both forms of rational thinking in their own personal and professional lives. The co-authors consider several examples of models that have been successfully used by people in various fields to integrate science and religion. (shrink)

Sharon Street’s influential Darwinian Dilemma argues that moral realism is incompatible with moral knowledge. In this paper I argue that Street’s argument cannot give us reason to reject moral realism. This is because the debunker’s own arguments imply that our evidence for the claim that we have moral knowledge underdetermines its truth. Furthermore, the final part of the Street’s argument, where she infers that moral realism must be false because we have moral knowledge, commits her to the view that underdetermining (...) evidence cannot justify belief. This implies that the debunker is not justified in believing that we have moral knowledge. As a result, Street’s debunking argument does not give us reason to reject realism (or accept anti-realism), even if we grant that they successfully establish the incompatibility of moral realism with our having moral knowledge. (shrink)

According to explanationism about epistemic defeat, our attitude towards the explanation of our belief in P can sometimes defeat our justification for holding that belief. In this paper I argue for the superiority of a particular version of explanationism which is considered and rejected by Korman and Locke (2023). According to this position our belief in P is defeated if we are not entitled to believe it is either (i) explained by P (i.e econnected), or (ii) explained by some third-factor (...) that also explains P (i.e tf-connected). Korman and Locke call this position “EThirdFactor”. I first argue that our belief in P can be justified if we are entitled to believe it is tf-connected but not e-connected, and argue against a recent proposal from Bogardus and Perrin that threatens this view (2019). I then outline some further rationale behind EThirdfactor, and my reasons for preferring it over alternative explanationist accounts that have been suggested in the literature. Finally, I defend this position against recent objections from Korman and Locke (2023) and others. I conclude that these objections do not threaten my claim that EThirdFactor is the most plausible version of explanationism on the market. (shrink)

"Das Rechtssystem geht davon aus, dass der Mensch – und nur der Mensch – eine natürliche Person ist. Das sei ein Irrtum, argumentiert Malte-Christian Gruber, denn die Rechtssubjektivität wird keineswegs alleine mit dem bloßen Menschsein begründet. Es ist die sittliche Autonomie, die den Menschen zu einem »Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind« (Kant) und mithin zur Person macht. Personen werden nicht mit dem Menschsein als solchem identifiziert, sondern durch die Zuschreibung von Handlungs- und Rechtsträgerschaft. Eine solche funktionale Vorstellung von (...) Rechtssubjektivität ist prinzipiell auch dazu imstande, neben Menschen noch weitere autonome Agenten als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten ein- zusetzen, z.B. technische Artefakte und andere nicht-menschliche Agenten. Christoph Menke macht dagegen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Erfindung neuer Rechte das eigentliche Bewegungsgesetz der politischen Emanzipation in der Moderne war. Das begann mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen und ist immer noch das generelle Modell, mit dem Politik und Theorie operieren, die neue Rechte für nicht-menschliche Lebewesen und Artefakte einfordern. So wie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die rechtliche Emanzipation zunächst über die Grenzen bürgerlicher Subjektivität hinausgeführt hat und soziale und kulturelle Rechte erfand, so sollen wir nun den weiteren, konsequenten Schritt tun und auch noch die Bindung der juridischen Anerkennung an die Kategorie menschlicher Subjektivität aufbrechen. Auch Bio- und Artefakte sollen als eigenständige Rechtssubjekte rekonstruiert werden. Es fehlt ihnen allerdings etwas, das in den emanzipatorischen Kämpfen der Vergangenheit schlechthin grundlegend war: Ein Träger von Rechten zu sein, hieß, ein Fordernder von Rechten, ja, ein Kämpfer für Rechte gewesen zu sein. Man konnte keine rechtliche Person als Träger von Rechten sein, ohne ein politisches Subjekt als Kämpfer und Denker von Rechten gewesen zu sein. Wenn die Bindung der rechtlichen Personalität an die menschliche Subjektivität aufgelöst wird, damit es Bio- und Artefakt-Rechte geben kann, löst sich zugleich auch diese Einheit von rechtlicher Personalität und politischer Subjektivität auf, die die moderne Idee der Rechte definiert hatte. The legal system assumes that human beings – and only human beings – are natural persons. That is erroneous, argues Malte-Christian Gruber, because legal subjectivity isn’t founded in humanity alone. It is moral autonomy that makes man into a “subject whose actions are capable of attribution” (Kant) and thus into a person. Personhood is not identified with being human as such, but by the attribution of actions and legal ownership. Besides human beings, such a functional concept of legal subjectivity can in principle also be applied to other autonomous agents as holder of rights and obligations, e.g. techno- logical artifacts and other non-human agents. Christoph Menke in turn points out that the invention of new rights was the actual law of motion of political emancipation in modern times. This began with the bourgeois revolutions and is still the general model with which politics and theory operate to claim new rights for non-human creatures and artifacts. Just as in the 19th and 20th centuries, the legal emancipation initially led beyond the limits of bourgeois subjectivity and in- vented social and cultural rights, so should we make a further consequent step and break with the dependence of juridical recognition on the category of human subjectivity. Also bio- and artifacts are to be reconstructed as independent legal entities. However, they lack something that was absolutely fundamental in the emancipatory struggles of the past: to be a subject of rights meant to have demanded rights, indeed, to have been a fighter for rights. One could not be a legal person and holder of rights without having been a political subject as fighter and thinker of rights. To suspend the dependence of legal personhood on human subjectivity so that there may be bio- and artifact-rights also means to dissolve the unity between legal personality and political subjectivity that once defined the modern idea of rights. ". (shrink)

This book revives the study of conventional implicatures in natural language semantics. H. Paul Grice first defined the concept. Since then his definition has seen much use and many redefinitions, but it has never enjoyed a stable place in linguistic theory. Christopher Potts returns to the original and uses it as a key into two presently under-studied areas of natural language: supplements and expressives. The account of both depends on a theory in which sentence meanings can be multidimensional. The (...) theory is logically and intuitively compositional, and it minimally extends a familiar kind of intensional logic, thereby providing an adaptable, highly useful tool for semantic analysis. The result is a linguistic theory that is accessible not only to linguists of all stripes, but also philosophers of language, logicians, and computer scientists who have linguistic applications in mind. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to show that the specific meaning of “affectivity” in Merleau-Ponty’s works can be better understood by approaching its connection with the notion of “imagination”. This strategy can be contrasted with Sartre’s approach; his specific conception of consciousness locks off the relation between imagination and affectivity from the start. On the contrary, the free play of this axis, which can be analysed since the early Phenomenology of Perception, allows for the overflowing of the horizon of (...) visibility of subjectivity toward a certain invisible. Th e concrete junction of imagination and affectivity then spreads out into the region of the notion of desire. (shrink)

Initiation de l'amitié -- En lisant en écrivant -- Le dérèglement originel de l'amour de soi humain -- Au démêlé avec Pascal -- Montaigne législateur? -- "Mointaigne a tort" -- "La justice est sujette à dispute" -- L'injustice du moi -- Pascal et Hobbes -- Le règlement de la dispute -- Une vraisemblance de justice.

What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?

A characteristic feature of Wagnerian and post-Wagnerian opera is the tendency to link scenes with numerous and often surprisingly lengthy orchestral interludes, frequently performed with the curtain closed. Often taken for granted or treated as a filler by audiences and critics, these interludes can take on very prominent roles, representing dream sequences, journeys and sexual encounters, and in some cases becoming a highlight of the opera. Christopher Morris investigates the implications of these important but strangely overlooked passages. Combining close (...) readings of individual musical texts with an investigation of the critical discourse surrounding the operas, Morris shows how the interludes shed light not only on the representational and narrative capacities of the orchestra, but also on the supposed 'absolute' realm of instrumental music, a concept to which many critics appealed when they associated the interludes with 'purely musical' and 'symphonic' qualities. (shrink)

The „left Hegelian” interpretation of Hegel′s theory of Sittlichkeit has shown that the claim of the concept of autonomy to establish an internal connection between normativity and freedom can only be carried out, if the subject of autonomy is defined by its participation in social practices. While the left Hegelian interpretation thereby solves the paradoxes of the Kantian tradition of understanding autonomy, it is destined to repeat the paradoxical structure of autonomy in a new and fundamental form. This follows from (...) the insight – articulated by Hegel′s anti-Aristotelian concept of “second nature” – that participation in social practices is at the same time the medium and the other of autonomy. Autonomy thus remains dependent on an act of liberation that cannot be an autonomous action itself. (shrink)

The focus of this chapter's discussion is on the specific nature of teacher knowledge, including KT (propositional knowledge), KH (know‐how), KA (knowledge by acquaintance) and their interrelationship. There are features of teaching that it may share with other occupations, namely those associated with craft, executive technician and technician occupations. There are also features of teacher knowledge that are specific to teaching, which receive attention in the literature.

This article takes up the important recent argument of Mearsheimer and Rosato that states are rational in their foreign policy behavior and that their rationality can be defined in terms of the quality of their decision-making process. In particular, they define a state decision as rational if the decision makers engage in a deliberative process with a final choice based on a credible theory. First, I take up other notions of rationality familiar from the statistical and economic literature, arguing that (...) these other definitions are more useful for realist theory. Then, by contrast with Mearsheimer and Rosato, I argue that what is fundamental about realism in international relations theory is a focus on the subjectively rational pursuit of state security, regardless of the process used to attain it. This approach incorporates most realist theorizing while allowing for the great diversity of state behavior predicted by various realist doctrines and observed in reality. Within realism, I maintain that the distinction between revisionist and status quo states cannot be elided as neorealism attempts to do. Finally, I argue that domestic politics, too, is best understand in realist terms, even in democratic states. (shrink)

Anders s’est toujours intéressé à Nietzsche. Devenu philosophe, c’est à travers la question des valeurs qu’il le croise lorsqu’il entreprend d’écrire une Kulturphilosophie. S’il le fascine tant, c’est pour avoir osé dénoncer l’absence de fondement de la morale. Mais, même fasciné, Anders n’est pas homme à suspendre la tendance fondamentalement critique de sa pensée : l’idéal d’une surhumanité que Nietzsche a proposé pour dépasser l’humanité bricoleuse de morales lui semble s’engager sur un terrain politiquement irrecevable. Déterminant la décadence du monde (...) comme son entrée dans un état technique du monde, Anders donne des accents nietzschéens à sa propre critique de la culture : c’est l’humanité tout entière qui doit devenir une surhumanité capable de révolutionner le monde pour le conserver…. (shrink)

Robert Reilly’s America on Trial presents a lengthy defense of the principles of the American Founding against recent critiques, especially focusing on those written from a Catholic perspective. His book finds a place in a larger discussion of American Catholic political thought that has been going on for more than a century. I first situate Reilly’s book within that debate, and then argue that Reilly’s account is correct on most counts. Some loose ends remain, but they can be dealt with (...) by expanding some of the points that Reilly has already made. I think, though, that other points not even raised by Reilly’s critics will require further reflection by future American Catholic political thinkers. In 2020, the sensus communis in America has ceased to be “cool and deliberate,” a desideratum for the regime mentioned in Federalist 63; we need to figure out ways to make it cool again. (shrink)

Psychedelic researchers and therapists must contend with the fact that psychedelics are highly scrutinized to a degree that does appear to be problematically exceptional. That said, we believe there are a few areas where such exceptionalism is warranted, and a refined bioethical paradigm might help advance psychedelic practice and research.

Contemporary art is a category that can admit art made in any medium, form, genre, and style. However, this unprecedented heterogeneity can make it difficult to understand what makes contemporary art distinct from other kinds of art. In this article, I aim to provide an account of what makes art contemporary. I develop my position by focussing on philosophy of contemporary art emerging from the so-called analytic tradition. I argue that though these philosophers have reckoned with many of the puzzles (...) posed by contemporary art’s heterogeneity, they fail to provide compelling theories of what makes art contemporary. In response, I propose that the best way to understand what makes an artwork contemporary is by understanding how it attempts to grapple with the issues of its own historical condition of ‘contemporaneity.’. (shrink)

Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.

I apply African moral precepts to the topic of ‘superlongevity’. I make the case that African theories give rise to three specific sorts of moral concern about life extension that are distinct from similar objections in Western literature: first, superlongevity presents a challenge to identity; second, significantly longer lives face increased challenges to their meaningfulness; third, life extension may be socially divisive, undermining key tenets of sharing a way of life and communing harmoniously with others. Although these distinctive concerns are (...) significant, I claim that their strength as objections to superlongevity depends heavily on the distribution of life extension technologies. Moreover, since African theories typically hold that moral excellence correlates with increasing age, they provide a prudential and moral incentive to live longer to develop personhood. (shrink)

Given the prevalence of hate ideology, a concerted, multipronged effort to combat it clearly seems in order. In this essay, I explore whether hate crime legislation is a permissible and advisable component of this effort. In particular, I consider whether it is morally permissible to impose enhanced punishments upon criminals who select their victims at least in part because of an animus toward members of the group to which the victim belongs. Would it be permissible to punish more severely a (...) White supremacist who attacks a person only because she is Black, for instance, or an anti-Semitic thief who selects her victims at least in part because they are Jewish? After sketching a preliminary defense of this type of hate crime legislation, I note some potential concerns, including vexing questions about the likely effects of imposing such laws under the present, nonideal circumstances in the United States. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that this view is false. In short, there are properties like the property of nonexistence, and it is metaphysically possible that some entity both exemplifies such a property and does not exist. I argue that such arguments are indeed successful against the standard formulation of serious actualism. However, I (...) also argue that we should distinguish a weaker formulation of serious actualism using the actualist distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world. This weaker formulation is then shown to be consistent with the existence and possible exemplification of properties like the property of nonexistence. I end with a novel argument for the truth of the weaker formulation. (shrink)